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Abstract 
Reflecting on the philosophical implications of evolution  
Evolution as paradigm is a prescribed topic in contemporary South African 
education. This means that macro-evolution – the idea that life evolved 
progressively from inert matter to humankind’s coming into being – must 
form the foundation of South African education. The aim of this article is to 
reflect, in a spirit of respectful yet critical enquiry, on three issues with 
regard to macro-evolution: First, the theory of macro-evolution is placed in 
its historical context which indicates that although this theory owes its 
widespread acceptance to Charles Darwin, it did not originate with him. 
Second, the scientific status of the theory of macro-evolution is scrutinised. 
Karl Popper’s view of this theory as a metaphysical framework for research 
is given, accompanied by a brief discussion. Third, three evolutionary 
worldviews are identified and discussed. 
Opsomming   
’n Besinning oor die filosofiese implikasies van evolusie 
Evolusie as paradigma word tans vir Suid-Afrikaanse onderwys voor-
geskryf. Dit beteken dat makroevolusie – die idee dat lewe progressief van-
af nie-lewende materie tot by die mens opwaarts ontwikkel het – die grond-
slag van die Suid-Afrikaanse onderwys moet vorm. Die doel met hierdie 
artikel is om in ’n gees van respekvolle dog kritiese vraagstelling oor drie 
sake wat op makroevolusie betrekking het, na te dink: Eerstens word die 
teorie van makroevolusie in sy historiese konteks geplaas wat daarop dui 
dat die wye aanvaarding van dié teorie wel aan Charles Darwin te danke is, 
maar dat dit nie by hom onstaan het nie. Tweedens word die wetenskaplike 
status van die teorie van makroevolusie onder oë geneem. Karl Popper se 
siening van dié teorie as ’n metafisiese navorsingsraamwerk word gegee 
en toegelig met ’n oorsigtelike bespreking. Derdens word drie evolusionêre 
wêreldbeskouings geïdentifiseer en bespreek. 
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1. Introduction 
In June 2000 the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) convened 
a colloquium on science and evolution at which Dr. Jeffrey Lever, a 
consultant to the HSRC’s Africa Human Genome Initiative, called for 
evolution as a paradigm for education. Education Minister Kader Asmal 
agreed with this call (Gosling, 2000). South African education will thus 
henceforth be embedded in the theory and paradigm of evolution – a 
given that makes a study of its philosophical worldview implications 
imperative. This article will therefore consider the following: 
• the historical roots of the theory of evolution 
• the philosophic-scientific status of the theory of evolution 
• possible evolutionary worldviews 
2. Clarification of the term “evolution” 
Throughout this article the term “evolution” refers to macro-evolution and 
not to microevolution. Microevolution is the observable and demonstrable 
evolutionary variations within a species lineage that occur both in nature 
and in the laboratory when a new breed of a plant or an animal species is 
bred, for example, a new rose or a new dog species (Hoover, 1988:16). 
Microevolution is the result of the “amazing machinery within the [living] 
cell capable of shuffling and recombining genetic information” (Ackerman 
& Williams, 1999:51). Microevolution should be taught – adaptation, 
natural selection, mutations, genetic drift, Mendelian genetics and DNA 
structure and variability. Unlike microevolution, macro-evolution has 
never been observed. Macro-evolution is a hypothetical extrapolation 
from microevolution. It is a theory of origins which posits that all the 
myriad forms of life evolved progressively from inert matter to 
humankind’s coming into being. 
3. The historical roots of the theory of evolution 
Macro-evolution and Darwin 
Macro-evolution owes its widespread acceptance to Charles Darwin 
(1809-1882) but it did not originate with him (Sunderland, 1988:13). 
Macro-evolutionary ideas can be traced in the ancient philosophies of the 
Chinese, Hindu, Egyptian, Assyrian and Greek nations. In ancient Greek 
thought the first name mentioned to elucidate a theory of origins involving 
a progressive evolution from simple elements into plants, then animals 
and finally into humans was Thales of Miletus (640-546 BC) (Sunderland, 
1988:13). These early theories revolved around the idea of the spon-
taneous generation of life from nothing or from nonliving matter (Goertz, 
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1990:5; Sunderland, 1988:13). For example, Aristotle believed that 
maggots and flies were generated from rotting flesh and slime (Goertz, 
1990:234), the Egyptians believed that frogs were spontaneously 
generated after the Nile had flooded (Sunderland, 1988:13) and the 
Chinese and medieval Europeans believed that insects developed from 
nothing on plants (Goertz, 1990:234-235; Sunderland, 1988:13). 
The chain of being 
Although Europe in its time of domination by the Roman Church paid 
nominal allegiance to biblical creationism (Morris, 1989:199), evolut-
ionary concepts were handed down through ancient Greek philosophers 
such as Plato and Aristotle (Sunderland, 1988:13). Western thought also 
inherited from the ancient Greeks the idea of a great chain of being 
(hierarchy of living earthly beings). Prior to Darwin the great chain of 
being was conceived of as a static, hierarchical structure ranging from 
the lowest, simplest form of life to the highest, most complex form of life. 
At the bottom of the great chain was inanimate matter and at the top was 
God. This scheme was especially popular during the Middle Ages till the 
late eighteenth century (Lovejoy, 1942:59). This schema was regarded 
as a metaphysical principle, a plan emanating from the mind of God 
(Morris, 1989:185; Stromberg, 1966:274).  
After Darwin the great chain of being was conceived of as an evo-
lutionary structure. The evolutionist and historian of evolutionary thought, 
Loren Eiseley (cited in Morris, 1989:185), maintains that “All that the 
Chain of being actually needed to become a full-fledged evolutionary 
theory was the introduction into it of the conception of time in vast 
quantities added to mutability of form”. The vast amount of time was 
supplied by geological uniformitarianism. In contrast to catastrophism 
which ascribes geological and fossil formation mainly to past catastrophic 
events (earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, climatic changes, floods or 
impacts of extraterrestrial bodies) uniformitarianism or gradualism ex-
plains geological and fossil formation by assuming the steady, un-
changing operation of natural forces over immensely long periods of 
time. The mechanism for the mutability of form was supplied by Charles 
Darwin’s hypothesis of natural selection or the survival of the fittest.  
Modern biological evolutionists 
Before Darwin there had been other modern biological evolutionists. 
Among these were Benoit de Maillet (1656-1738), Pierre de Maupertuis 
(1698-1759), Comte de Buffon (1707-1788), Charles Darwin’s grand-
father Erasmus Darwin (1731-1802) and Jean Baptiste de Lamarck 
(1744-1829). According to the historian, Benjamin Farrington (cited in 
Sunderland, 1988:15), Darwin did not acknowledge the previous 
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contributions to his theory nor that natural selection had been used by 
the theologian, William Paley, (1743-1805) and the nineteenth-century 
scientist, Edward Blyth, who argued that only the fittest survived in order 
to preserve the created type. In articles published in 1835 and 1837 Blyth 
presented the idea of natural selection of which Darwin claimed to be the 
originator. Blyth’s conclusion was that the survival of the strongest in a 
species was a conservative principle which enabled the transmission of 
superior qualities to offspring and thereby secured the survival of the 
species (Sunderland, 1988:16; Morris, 1989:157-158).  
With regard to the theologian, William Paley, Farrington writes that Dar-
win was familiar with Paley’s book of 1802, Natural theology or evidence 
of the existence and attributes of the Deity collected from the appear-
ances of nature, and “found his logic as cogent as that of Euclid” 
(Sunderland, 1988:15). It was therefore not weak or erroneous argu-
mentation on Paley’s part that led Darwin to reject Paley’s (and Blyth’s) 
view that natural selection speaks of phylic stability and to posit instead 
natural selection as the mechanism for evolution from lower species to 
new, higher species. Paley and Darwin had different metaphysical 
beliefs. Paley was a theist and the chief burden of his book “was that all 
nature speaks of the Designer behind it” (Wilder-Smith, 1981a:229). 
Darwin was an agnostic (Brown, 1968:149; Stromberg, 1966:279) and he 
“attempted to explain the origination of the great diversity of life without 
the necessity of any divine power” (Sunderland, 1988:16). Wilder-Smith 
(1981a:230) points out that one of Darwin’s central theses was the 
illogical claim “that design by no means proved a designer behind it”. 
Darwin’s theory 
Darwin’s theory rapidly gained popularity, which can be ascribed to the 
secular intellectual climate that the eighteenth-century Enlightenment 
had engendered. When Darwin published The origin of species by 
means of natural selection or the preservation of favoured races in the 
struggle for life in 1859, “people were in the mood to hail it as what 
seemed to be the first totally acceptable explanation for the origin and 
development of living things” (Frair & Davis, 1983:12). From the ob-
served evidence of microevolutionary changes within a species, namely 
adaptation and natural selection, Darwin drew the conclusion that radical 
changes in phylic form have occurred in the past and led to the variety 
and complexity of life forms as they are known today (Wilder-Smith, 
1981a:24). Darwin did not address the origin of the first living system, but 
macro-evolution includes the idea that the first life evolved from inert 
matter. 
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At this stage it is appropriate to explore how Karl Popper, twentieth-
century’s foremost philosopher of science, classifies the theory of macro-
evolution. 
4. The philosophical-scientific status of the theory of 
evolution 
Karl Popper’s views 
Karl Popper himself is an evolutionist, but he says the following about 
Darwin’s theory:  
I have come to the conclusion that Darwinism [by extension, any theory 
on origins] is not a testable scientific theory, but a metaphysical 
research programme [emphasis mine] – a possible framework for 
testable scientific theories. It suggests the existence of a mechanism of 
adaptation ... This is of course the reason why Darwinism has been 
almost universally accepted. Its theory of adaptation was the first 
nontheistic one that was convincing; and theism was worse than an 
open admission of failure, for it created the impression that an ultimate 
explanation had been reached (cited in Sunderland, 1988:28; italics – 
Sunderland). 
In other words, Popper classifies the theory of evolution – macro-
evolution – as a paradigm which science can use to account for the 
variety of living things and he ascribes its widespread acceptance to its 
nontheistic explanation of phylic variation. Popper classifies macro-
evolutionary theory as a metaphysical paradigm because it is not 
falsifiable. Popper’s best known contribution to the philosophy of science 
was that he recognised that to be scientific a theory must in principle be 
falsifiable. A theory is good if it could very easily be falsified, and when it 
consistently survives all tests, it is accepted as a valid theory (Cloete, 
2000:41; Gitt,1997:24, note 3). 
Macro-evolution deals with unique events. Even a laboratory simulation 
of such an event would not conclusively prove that the original event 
occurred in the same way. Scientists do of course cite facts and 
observations in support of macro-evolution, and one does not contest 
such facts. However, the explanatory theories, that is the conclusions 
scientists draw from facts and observations, are not as a matter of 
course true (Wilder-Smith, 1975:32). Theories must be experimentally 
tested, but 
the only aspect of his [Darwin’s] theory which has received any support 
over the past century is where it applies to microevolutionary pro-
cesses. His general theory that all life on earth originated by a gradual 
successive accumulation of fortuitous mutations, is still, as it was in 
Darwin’s time, a highly speculative hypothesis entirely without direct 
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factual support and very far from that self-evident axiom some of its 
more aggressive advocates would have us believe (Denton, 1987:77, 
see also 345). 
The crucial evidence of an intermediate, transitional fossil is still lacking 
(Brand, 1997:172 ff; Denton, 1987:162 ff; Holbrook, 1987:147-149, 208; 
Parker, 1987:128 ff; Sunderland, 1988:69 ff, 98 ff) and claims, usually of 
an ape-to-human transition, deserve serious consideration but not a too-
ready, uncritical acceptance (Parker, 1987:160). Macro-evolution would 
require that the cell produces new genetic information, but molecular 
biologists have found that this cannot be done. Natural selection, genetic 
drift and laboratory-manipulation shuffle or deplete genetic information 
but do not add new information to the existing genetic code (Ackerman & 
Williams, 1999:51). With regard to the generation of life from inert matter, 
already in1864 Louis Pasteur’s “swan-neck jar” experiments proved that 
biogenesis does not occur without mediation of previously existing life 
(as a canning factory also proves) (Goertz, 1990:6; Wilder-Smith, 1981a: 
23, 1981b:viii-ix).  
Macro-evolutionary theory: flaws and illogicalities 
The examination of macro-evolutionary theory reveals “flaws, illogical-
ities, non-sequiters” (Holbrook,1987:9) and some evolutionists have 
admitted that there are facts that are ignored and that the theory is 
altered to fit selected data (Klein, 1988:5). Nevertheless, the theory could 
be true, and scientists may discover how to synthesise aspects of macro-
evolution, for example, creating life from nonlife. Molecular biology has 
revealed that the creation of a new living system requires the physical 
elements (building blocks), energy (power), the pertinent information 
(design or blueprint which at present is only accessible to scientists via 
existing living systems) and processes which guarantee the correct, 
orderly use of the information (Mohr, 1989:146). At present scientists do 
not know what these processes are and whether natural laws govern 
their functioning. Scientists can therefore at present only create life from 
existing living systems. However, finding and applying the relevant 
natural laws, if they exist, and thereby creating life from nonlife in the 
laboratory cannot be ruled out, but it would not prove macro-evolution. It 
would not be the natural laws that created the new living system, but the 
application of the laws by the intelligent mind of the scientist (Wilder-
Smith, 1974:92-93; 1975:32-35; 1981a:25 ff).  
The origin of the first living system is scientifically untestable, and 
acceptance or rejection of any explanatory theory is ultimately a matter of 
faith. Faith, not scientific evidence, is reflected in the biochemist Ernest 
Kahane’s statement: “Its absurd and absolutely preposterous to believe 
that a living cell could come into existence by itself; but, notwithstanding, 
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I do believe it, because I cannot imagine anything else” (cited in Gitt, 
1993:13-14).  
The fact that macro-evolution is a metaphysical and not a scientific 
theory is of course no reason for not embedding education in an 
evolutionary paradigm, but only if its philosophical, worldview 
implications are not an infringement of a student’s constitutional right to 
freedom of belief. In the next section these implications will be 
scrutinised. 
5. Evolutionary worldviews 
The physicist and social critic Fritjof Capra (1990:105) points out that 
Darwin’s theory “forced scientists to abandon the Newtonian picture of 
the world as a machine that had emerged fully constructed from the 
hands of its Creator, and to replace it with the concept of an evolving and 
ever changing system”. Capra is not saying the existence of God must 
be denied. He himself subscribes to the worldview that this author has 
dubbed “spiritual naturalism” (see last paragraph in this section). Capra 
says that the acceptance of macro-evolution calls for the abandonment 
of the biblical view of nature as exogenously designed and created with 
species distinctly different from one another. The biblical view of nature 
excludes only macro-evolution; it does not exclude microevolution.  
With regard to humankind, macro-evolution brings humanity down to the 
level of animal – the animal with the highest intelligence. This became 
the accepted view not only in the biological sciences, but also in the 
budding human sciences of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. After 
Darwin the early representatives of the humanities “held the view that 
man was no longer a person created in the image of God, but an 
elevated animal governed by drives and instincts. All that is essential in 
man was reduced, not to his relation to the Creator, but to his presumed 
origins from the animal kingdom” (Ouweneel, 1986:83). 
The following evolutionary worldviews, relevant to the argument of this 
article, are discussed:  
• Materialism: This worldview denies the existence of God. According to 
this worldview there is only the physical world driven by blind 
mechanical forces and life arose and evolved purely by chance. 
Materialism was appropriated by Western science and has been 
dubbed scientific materialism. 
• Theistic evolutionism: This worldview maintains that an extracosmic 
God, not chance, directed the macro-evolutionary processes and 
God’s method of progressive creation was either to use natural 
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selection or to imbue original matter with a vital force that caused it to 
surge upwards slowly and inexorably to more and higher complexity 
(Wilder-Smith, 1974:167-168).  
• Spiritual naturalism: This worldview upholds divine existence but not 
as an extracosmic reality. It ascribes to the cosmos the divine 
attributes of self-sufficiency and of being the source of all existence. 
Macro-evolution is ascribed to vitalism, that is, macro-evolution is the 
result of inherent psychic/spiritual properties of matter. This is an 
essentially pantheistic and/or animistic view in which “God is the 
organising matrix ... that which enlivens matter” (Ferguson, 1989: 
420). This is also the religious position that materialists would arrive at 
if religion were to be refurbished from within the worldview of scientific 
materialism, because it too views the cosmos as self-sufficient and the 
source of all reality. Veneration of the cosmos, says Veith (1987:110), 
is illustrated in the rapt emotion and religious language of materialist 
scientists like Carl Sagan who claims: “The Cosmos is all there is, all 
there was, and all there ever will be.” With these words, Sagan 
opened his television series, The Cosmos, produced in 1978. 
Of the above worldviews materialism shall be discussed first. 
5.1  Materialism 
Materialism is a worldview that regards life as purely “an organised 
condition of matter” (Von Wahlert & Von Wahlert cited in Gitt, 1993:77), 
and mind as “merely the highest product of matter” (Engels cited in Gitt 
1993:48). Within the parameters of materialism, explanations of every-
thing are restricted to natural causes only. Appropriated by science, 
science is defined as the human activity of seeking only natural 
explanations for what is observed in nature, which means that divine 
intervention in nature, also in abiogenesis and phylogenesis, is by 
definition excluded from science. 
Materialism reduces the purpose of life to physical survival. It is a bleak 
philosophy and for many people ultimately intolerable. Humans do yearn 
for a deeper spiritual meaning to life. Such yearning revealed itself in the 
West’s youthful counterculture of the 1960s and 1970s and in the interest 
in mysticism that is currently dispersed throughout Western culture. 
Materialism is thus rejected by many Westerners. However, most of 
these people have not rejected macro-evolution; they accept it as a 
scientifically proven fact.  
Spirituality and a higher meaning to life are added to macro-evolution 
and the result is either theistic evolutionism or spiritual naturalism. Both 
these worldviews are not acknowledged by the scientific establishment. 
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5.2 Adding spirituality to the theory of evolution 
5.2.1  Theistic evolutionism 
The example of theistic evolutionism that will be briefly reviewed in this 
article is that of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin (1881-1955), a Jesuit priest 
schooled in palaeontology. Teilhard de Chardin’s ideas are present in 
and still inspire contemporary theistic evolutionists such as Denis 
Edwards (1999), John Haught (2000), Karl Schmitz-Moorman (1997) and 
Wentzel van Huysteen (1998). Theistic evolutionists proceed from the 
assumption that macro-evolution is a fact. As Schmitz-Moorman (1997: 
16) puts it, macro-evolution “is the first concern when we consider 
essential changes in tools for theological reflection on God’s creation”. 
In the fashion of all theistic evolutionists, Teilhard de Chardin (1955: 
319 ff) first worked out his evolutionary theory and then fitted Christianity 
into it. The starting point was evolution: “Evolution is a light illuminating 
all facts, a curve that all lines must follow” (Teilhard de Chardin, 1955: 
241). In contrast to materialism where evolution is without purpose and 
directed only by chance factors, Teilhard de Chardin held to the 
anthropic principle that the very thrust of evolution was the appearance 
of humankind (Fernando, 1983:29). Randomness was only apparent:  
Beneath the apparent randomness of trial and error and natural 
selection there is a privileged axis, along which evolution is trying to 
move all the time – towards increasing complexity and consciousness. 
Man is the end-point which gives meaning to everything that went 
before (Fernando, 1983:28).  
Teilhard de Chardin ascribed the upward direction of evolution to a God-
created inherent psychic urge in matter that drives it inexorably forwards 
and upwards to greater physical complexity, life and consciousness. 
Teilhard de Chardin “believed that God made matter so that it was an 
algorithm of all life and order in the past, present and future” (Wilder-
Smith, 1981a:223). The evolution of both physical complexity and con-
sciousness reached a high point in human beings. With the breakthrough 
into humanity the noosphere (the mind-sphere – derived from the Greek 
word nous for mind) was added to the earth’s biosphere (the layer of life 
on the surface of the earth) (Teilhard de Chardin, 1955:202). In the 
noosphere evolution occurred differently from the way it occurred in the 
biosphere. Changes in physical organisation ceased and humanity 
started to progress towards one unbroken “interthinking” whole, the final 
point of the whole evolutionary process, which he called the Omega 
Point (Teilhard de Chardin, 1955:266 ff). Teilhard (1955:322) added 
Christ to his theory by positing Him as both the inner “principle of vitality” 
as well as the Omega Point.  
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Teilhard de Chardin added the concepts of Christianity to evolution, but 
the evolutionist and ecophilosopher Skolimowski (1983:60-61) maintains 
that evolutionary theory cannot accommodate orthodox Christianity: 
There is profound incoherence in Teilhard’s view of evolution: on the 
one hand, it is for him a forward unfolding process which culminates at 
Omega Point, at the end of time; and on the other hand, it is a process 
of going back to the original Christian God. By attempting to subsume 
Omega Point under Christian theology, Teilhard undermines the raison 
d’etre of evolution as an unfolding and self-actualising process ... [T]he 
Judeo-Christian tradition ... is based on the notion of Paradise 
Lost/Paradise Regained; ... If we recognise the notion and the authority 
of God as conceived in the traditional religions, particularly Christianity 
... [w]hat we can do and the only thing we can do is to return to the 
Paradise Lost, to reacquire virtues that have been bestowed on us by 
God-the-Original-Maker ... 
But there is a way of incorporating the Christo/Genesis into evolutionary 
design, namely by treating Christ not as God, as a point of final destiny 
and ultimate striving, but as a symbol, an inspiration, a reminder that 
even at that stage of our evolutionary development we are capable of 
so much grace and divinity. The Christ-consciousness becomes ... an 
imaginary flame that illumines our road towards greater grace and 
consciousness.  
Skolimowski is not a Christian, but he acknowledges that macro-
evolution is logically inconsistent with the foundational theme of the 
Bible, that is Creation, Fall and Redemption. Skolimowski admits that 
macro-evolution can only logically accommodate the man Jesus as a 
prototype of human potentiality and the Christ as an idea, an inner 
principle that drives humanity upwards to higher states of spiritual 
consciousness.  
Wilder-Smith (1974:167 ff) who is a Christian and a scientist – he has 
three doctorates in chemistry and pharmacology – also argues that the 
god of theistic evolutionism cannot be harmonised with the God of the 
Bible. He argues as follows: Macro-evolution, be it by chance or under 
divine direction, proceeds via struggle, suffering, pain, death and decay. 
It denies the weak, the ill or otherwise physically or psychically unfit an 
existence and favours instead the strong. Life certainly is like this, and 
the Bible ascribes it to man’s fall into sin. However, the God of the Bible, 
who is one with Jesus Christ and who gave us the Sermon on the Mount, 
is not like this. The God of the Bible is a God of love, but He is also a 
God of judgement. He uses struggle, suffering, pain and death to punish 
sin, but He punishes righteously. He is a just God. He would never 
destroy those who are weak and sick for no fault of their own to create 
higher forms of life. The materialist molecular biologist, Jacques Monod, 
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also argues that the Christian God would not use the destruction of the 
weak as a method of creation (cited in Ham,1997:74-76).  
In the next section two theories of spiritual naturalism will be reviewed. 
They are James Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis and Rupert Sheldrake’s 
theory of morphic fields.  
5.2.2  Spiritual naturalism 
5.2.2.1  Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis 
Using the Greek name Gaia for the earth goddess, James Lovelock, an 
independent British scientist, presented the idea that the earth is alive. 
Lovelock (1979:11) defines Gaia as “a complex entity involving the 
Earth’s biosphere, atmosphere, oceans and soil; the totality constituting a 
feedback or cybernetic system which seeks an optimal physical and 
chemical environment for life on this planet”. 
The Gaia hypothesis posits that the biosphere and the nonliving environ-
ment evolved, and are still in constant interaction in order to regulate 
suitable living conditions. Lovelock based the Gaia hypothesis on the fact 
that, contrary to other known planets, the earth has environmental 
conditions that allow life to flourish. The climate and the chemical 
compositions of the atmosphere (air), lithosphere (soil) and hydrosphere 
(oceans) are so finely tuned to support life that: “For this to have 
happened by chance is as unlikely as to survive unscathed a drive 
blindfold through rush-hour traffic” (Lovelock, 1991:15). Lovelock’s 
argument is thus the age-old argument that a design points to a 
designer, but his designer is Gaia, the hypothetical interactive system 
between the biosphere and the nonliving environment itself. 
Gaia and Daisyworld 
The materialistic scientific establishment criticised Gaia as a vitalistic, 
teleological concept; “one that required foresight and planning by the 
biota [all living creatures]” (Lovelock, 1991:15). Lovelock’s (1991:15 ff) 
response to this criticism was a computer model of Gaia which he called 
Daisyworld, a planet with the environment reduced to one variable, 
temperature, and the biosphere to one species, daisies in which light and 
dark varieties appear. Lovelock (1991:17-18) explains: 
Imagine a time in the distant past of Daisyworld. The star that warms it 
was less luminous, so that only in the equatorial region was the mean 
temperature of bare ground warm enough, 5°C, for growth. Here daisy 
seeds would slowly germinate and flower. Let us assume that in the first 
crop multicolored, light, and dark species were equally represented. 
Even before the first season’s growth was over, the dark daisies would 
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have been favored. Their greater absorption of sunlight in the localities 
where they grew would have warmed them above 5°C. The light-
colored daisies would be at a disadvantage. Their white flowers would 
have faded and died because, reflecting the sunlight as they do, they 
would have cooled below the critical temperature of 5°C. 
The next season would see the dark daisies off to a head start, for their 
seeds would be the most abundant. Soon their presence would warm 
not just the plants themselves, but, as they grew and spread across the 
bare ground, would increase the temperature of the soil and air, at first 
locally and then regionally. With this rise of temperature, the rate of 
growth, the length of the warm season, and the spread of dark daisies 
would exert a positive feedback and lead to the colonization of most of 
the planet by dark daisies. The spread of dark daisies would eventually 
be limited by a rise of global temperature to levels above the optimum 
for growth. Any further spread of dark daisies would lead to a decline in 
seed production. In addition, when the global temperature is high, white 
daisies will grow and spread in competition with the dark ones. The 
growth and spread of white daisies is favored then because of their 
natural ability to keep cool. 
As the star that shines on Daisyworld grows hotter and hotter, the 
proportion of dark to light daisies changes until, finally, the heat flux is 
so great that even the whitest daisy crop cannot keep enough of the 
planet below the critical 40°C upper limit for growth. At this time flower 
power is not enough. The planet becomes barren again, and so hot that 
there is no way for daisy life to start again. 
From Lovelock’s explanation of Daisyworld it is clear that the interaction 
between the biosphere and the environment can be envisaged without 
invoking biological foresight, planning or purpose. However, it has no link 
whatsoever with evolution. There is no evolution (macro or even micro) in 
Daisyworld. Daisyworld and its star are a created universe, conceived of 
in Lovelock’s mind and manifested outside of his mind (on the computer 
screen). On Daisyworld, only repeated cycles of birth, growth and death 
take place within three fixed laws. These laws are: First, the star 
becomes progressively hotter; second, daisy life is limited to 
temperatures between 5°C and 40°C; third, dark and light colours absorb 
and reflect heat respectively. On the planet life did not evolve. Its 
potential (daisy seeds) was present on the bare ground and no micro-
evolutionary variations changed the colour of the daisies. All colours 
“were equally represented” in the first crop. Thereafter the dominant 
colour, dark or light, depended on the number of daisies of the same 
colour that survived the previous crop, “for their seeds would be the most 
abundant”. In Lovelock’s model the self-regulating dynamics of Daisy-
world do nothing more than reflect the fixed laws which Lovelock 
designed into the system, and the model leaves his Gaia hypothesis as 
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an explanation of macro-evolution unvalidated and, in fact, serves to 
support the idea of a Designer outside nature.  
If the daisies in Daisyworld were sentient beings and effected a scientific 
search for a unifying principle they would eventually have found the 
lawful order that Lovelock programmed into Daisyworld, and they would 
have possibly believed both the order and the creator of the order to be 
endogenous to Daisyworld. To realise their error, the daisies would need 
to argue that an intelligent design requires an intelligent and exogenous 
designer. 
Lovelock’s acknowledgement of purpose and order in the world deserves 
praise. A world without purpose is a joyless world. Darwin himself, when 
approaching ultimate death, admitted in his writings that on the basis of 
his theory he had lost his joy in the arts and in nature (Alexander, 1972: 
106; Schaeffer, 1970:9). 
In the next section Sheldrake’s theory of morphic fields will be analysed. 
5.2.2.2  Sheldrake’s theory of morphic fields 
Rupert Sheldrake is a biologist who did research work on plant 
physiology in India. Sheldrake is a self-admitted animist. He proposes 
that morphic fields (analogous to electric and magnetic fields) surround 
all systems (living and nonliving) and that these fields govern macro-
evolution. Sheldrake (1990:82) derived the term “morphic” from the 
Greek word morphe meaning “form”. 
In support of his theory Sheldrake (1990:82) appealed to biologists in the 
1920s who discovered that some plants and animals can regenerate 
their form from a portion of the “mother” plant or animal. Purposive 
tendencies are also revealed in the instinctual behaviour of the animal 
world (Sheldrake, 1990:90 ff). Such tendencies cannot be explained by 
purposeless, mechanical forces, but point to an intelligent plan which, 
although anathema to materialists, reinstates the argument from design 
to Designer. However, Sheldrake (like Lovelock) seeks both plan and 
planner solely in the natural world. Sheldrake explains nature’s purposive 
tendencies in terms of his animistic, cosmos-bound spirituality but 
translated into scientific terminology. Morphic fields and the vibratory 
frequencies of morphic resonance assume the roles that ancient animism 
ascribed to inner spiritual powers. 
Sheldrake (1990:88) postulates that “self-organizing systems at all levels 
of complexity, including molecules, crystals, cells, tissues, organisms and 
societies of organisms are organized by fields called ‘morphic fields’. 
Morphogenetic fields are just one type of morphic field, those concerned 
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with the development and maintenance of bodies of organisms”. Morphic 
fields are of “an intrinsically evolutionary nature ... a kind of collective 
memory on which each member of the species draws, and to which it in 
turn contributes” (Sheldrake, 1990:88). Information is transferred from 
past to present members of a species through morphic resonance, the 
influence of which, Sheldrake (1990:88-89) claims, determines the 
characteristic form and behaviour of the species and should, furthermore, 
be understood probabilistically as evolving habits and not as fixed and 
predetermined. In other words, Sheldrake attributes the regularity of 
biological form and behaviour to morphic fields which are never fixed but 
always subject to evolutionary change and complexification. 
Sheldrake’s evidence of morphic fields 
• A new morphic field has to come into existence 
Sheldrake (1990:89 ff) provides three examples of evidence which he 
alleges is in favour of his hypothesis of morphic fields. Two relate to form 
and one relates to behaviour. Sheldrake’s (1990:89) first example related 
to form is as follows:  
[W]hen a newly synthesised organic chemical is crystallized for the first 
time – say a new drug – there will be no morphic resonance from 
previous crystals of this type. A new morphic field has to come into 
existence ... The next time the substance is crystallized anywhere in the 
world, morphic resonance from the first crystals will make this same 
pattern of crystallization more probable ...  
The existence of a morphic field and its resonance is, however, pure 
speculation whilst his reference to the synthesis of a new chemical 
compound is actually a contradiction of his metaphysical position, namely 
that nature is its own designer. It serves rather to support the super-
naturalist position of a Designer outside nature: The scientist who 
synthesised the new chemical compound applied his exogenous mental 
plan to the ordering of the constituent chemicals. The origin of the new 
chemical compound is the scientist’s exogenous intelligence that ordered 
the constituent chemicals in the correct way (cf. Wilder-Smith, 1981a:25 
ff, 1975:55 ff).  
• Certain abnormalities become more likely 
The other example that Sheldrake (1990:90) supplies with regard to form 
is that experiments on fruit flies have shown that certain abnormalities 
become more likely once such an abnormality has appeared in one 
member of a species. This, however, demonstrates only micro-
evolutionary changes and such changes are heritable. The abnormal fruit 
flies did not undergo macro-evolution to become a totally different 
species. Macro-evolution would require that new information be added to 
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the existing genetic code, which biologists have ascertained does not 
happen. Natural selection, random genetic drift and laboratory-
manipulation can act only on existing genetic information and cause only 
variations within a species (Ackerman & Williams, 1999:51, 82). Whether 
new genetic information could be added in the past, which is what 
macro-evolution requires, is a matter of hypothetical speculation. Shel-
drake believes that the addition of new genetic information occurred in 
the past and could even still occur because of the vitalistic changeability 
of the morphic fields that supposedly govern genetic behaviour. Never-
theless, his argument for the existence of such fields is faulty; when his 
example is debated in the light of validated knowledge about genetic 
behaviour, it actually stresses phylic stability (Smith, 1992:56-57). 
• Morphic fields are a collective but changeable memory bank 
Sheldrake (1990:91) gives another example, related to behaviour, to 
support his idea of morphic fields as a collective but always changeable 
memory bank. He claims that when one group of rats learnt new 
behaviour, other rats showed a tendency to learn the new behaviour 
faster. But the house training of puppies clearly refutes the notion of an 
evolving memory bank. Even if it did exist for some behavioural aspects 
of some species, one still struggles to understand why behaviour at the 
deepest instinctual level (such as that of a female mud wasp who always 
builds her nest in the same way) is viewed by Sheldrake (1990:90-91) as 
merely a habit attributable to the collective power of morphic resonance 
and not a given law of nature. 
• Morphic determinism and morphic freedom 
Light is thrown on Sheldrake’s reasoning by the way in which he resolves 
the conflict in his system between morphic determinism and morphic 
freedom. Sheldrake (1990:90-91) regards the instinctual behaviour of a 
species as “a fixed action pattern” predetermined by morphic resonance. 
This, Sheldrake (1990:104) says, is a habit, the continual repetition of 
which gives it the appearance of a law, which means that future 
members of a species have the freedom to change inherited morphic 
fields in the same way that humans can change inherited character traits 
by an act of will. Motivated by his belief in animism, Sheldrake 
anthropomorphises nature to the extent that human freedom of will is 
projected on to nature. However, anthropomorphism of nature, as 
Francis Schaeffer (1970:25) points out, is an evasion of the reality of 
nature. It endows nature with characteristics it does not possess and 
ignores its real characteristics. 
Sheldrake (1990:109) criticises the idea of fixed laws because “[t]he 
designing mind of ... God [as Creator] is still there in the background”. 
Reflecting on the philosophical implications of evolution  
186 Koers 68(2 & 3) 2003:171-189 
Flying in the face of scientific evidence, Sheldrake (1990:103) maintains 
that “[t]he idea of the laws of nature is based on a political metaphor. Just 
as human societies are governed by laws, so the whole of nature is 
supposedly ruled by the laws of nature”. Sheldrake is in fact echoing 
Alfred North Whitehead (cited in Jaki, 1989:20) who also denied the idea 
of natural laws. The criticism of this view by the physicist and historian of 
science, Prof. Stanley Jaki (1989:19-20), is scathing: “Such a view had 
little room for exact science but plenty for unbridled fantasies ... 
Whitehead never explained how science ... can be cultivated on that very 
‘temporary’ basis.” 
Sheldrake (1990:102) regards the acknowledgement of natural laws as 
an outdated way of thinking which “bears a strong resemblance to the 
Christian theology of creation by the word or logos of God”. Fixed laws 
and macro-evolution are correctly accepted by Sheldrake (1990:103) as 
logical contradictions: “If all nature evolves, why should the laws of 
nature not evolve as well? Why should we go on assuming that they are 
eternally fixed?” 
In a book which is documented with great detail and grounded in a keen 
understanding of science (ancient and modern) and cultural philosophies 
(ancient and modern), Jaki (1974:vii) indicates that: 
Great cultures where the scientific enterprise came to a standstill, 
invariably failed to formulate the notion of physical law, or the law of 
nature. Theirs was a theology with no belief in a personal, rational, 
absolutely transcendent Lawgiver, or Creator. Their cosmology re-
flected a pantheistic and animistic view of nature caught in the treadmill 
of perennial, inexorable returns. The scientific quest found fertile soil 
when this faith in a personal, rational Creator had truly permeated a 
whole culture, beginning with the centuries of the High Middle Ages. It 
was that faith which provided, in sufficient measure, confidence in the 
rationality of the universe, trust in progress, and appreciation of the 
quantitative method, all indispensable ingredients of the scientific quest. 
Jaki (1974:356) points out that there is in our time “a steadily growing 
realization that the man of science, no less that his counterpart in 
religion, lives ultimately by faith”. As people of faith, scientists are, 
according to both Jaki (1974:356 ff) and Sheldrake (1990:102 ff), faced 
with two foundational alternatives – confidence in a law-abiding universe, 
a confidence in which empirical, exact science flourished, but which by 
its very nature, as Sheldrake (1990:102) recognises, implies “creation by 
the word or logos of God”, or the acceptance of the full implications of an 
evolving universe where all orderliness is dissolved in a state of 
perpetual flux, and purpose is sought in “pantheism and immanentism” 
(Jaki, 1974:356).  
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6. Conclusion 
Evolution as a paradigm for education would mean that the theory of 
evolution as the explanation of the origin of the universe and the life it 
contains, and its concomitant worldviews, would be taught exclusively 
and, inevitably, as the assured, incontrovertible conclusion of science, 
which it is not. Leonard Brand (1997), a biologist, Werner Gitt (1997), an 
information scientist, and Hugh Ross (2001), an astrophysicist, are 
among the contemporary natural scientists who use up-to-date scientific 
evidence to build a compelling case for the biblical worldview. Intellectual 
honesty demands that students also be presented with this alternative 
logical interpretation of scientific data which have a bearing on the 
question of the origin of the universe and the life it contains. The 
metaphysical nature of the theory of evolution should be acknowledged. 
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